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The Relationship between Team Payroll and
Team Performance in the National Hockey League
Brandie Glasnapp
ABSTRACT. The National Hockey League (NHL) is in serious financial trouble. More
than half of the 30 teams lost money during the 2002-03 season. Player salaries have
increased dramatically over the last decade and payroll costs account for the majority of
total operating costs. This paper analyzes how team payroll affects team performance.
Linear Regression analysis is used to determine the effect of payroll on performance. A
Granger Causality test is performed using payroll and performance data from the 1998-99
to 2003-04 seasons. No conclusive evidence is found that supports the common belief that
payroll can be used to predict a team’s success.

I. Introduction
There are cracks in the National Hockey League’s ice. Player salaries are
higher than ever before and many teams’ operating revenues have failed
to meet costs. The overall health of the league is at risk due to the
financial losses of individual teams. What can teams do to consistently
win and also make a profit? In professional sports, emphasis is placed on
paying extraordinary sums of money to the best players–athletes who will
surely help the team win a championship. Recent National Hockey
League (NHL) owners have tested this theory. Some have been
successful with a high payroll while others have succeeded with much
lower payrolls. It can be shown that a high payroll may help sustain
success but it is not a significant determinant of a team’s point total. NHL
teams need to start making a positive operating profit. Reevaluating
player salaries should be the first priority. Team success is determined
by how teammates perform on the ice together, not by the sum of its
players’ salaries.

II. Current Economic Trouble
Although sports are flourishing in America, the NHL is on the brink of
disaster. Former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Arther
Levitt released a study on February 18, 2004 confirming that NHL teams
lost a combined $273 million last season [Brehm, 2004, para 1]. Levitt
discovered that 19 teams posted numbers in the red while 11 clubs earned
23
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an average of $6.4 million. The most remarkable statistic is the make-up
of league costs; approximately 75 percent of all revenue went to players
in the form of salaries, bonuses, and benefits. Levitt found player costs
to equal approximately $1.5 billion, nearly 67 percent of total operating
costs [Brehm, 2004, para 5]. Revenues have increased in the last ten
years; player costs have just increased more.
Owners argue that salary inflation has gotten out of hand and that the
economic structure of the league is detrimental to its future. Players
contend that owners have an incentive to exaggerate the impact of salaries
on franchise costs. The Collective Bargaining Agreement between the
NHL and the NHL Players’ Association runs out on September 15, 2004.
There are no restrictions on player mobility other than a comprehensive
entry draft and free agency system. Unlike other professional sports, the
NHL has not enacted any kind of salary cap or tax on player salaries and
less revenue is shared among franchises in the NHL than in any other
professional sport. NHL owners are threatening to lock out the players in
the fall if a new Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be reached that
includes some kind of salary restraint.
Another problem for the NHL is its limited TV revenue. The league’s
$120 million per year rights fee is expected to drop by 50 percent when
a new deal with ABC is announced shortly. This is far from the contracts
held by the National Football League, Major League Baseball, the
National Basketball Associaton and NASCAR. Each of these has
multiyear contracts that exceed $1 billion. The NHL has no leverage with
the networks because ESPN and ESPN2 hockey ratings are down 17
percent from last season. [Zulgad, 2004, 1]
The NHL needs to control its costs quickly, before it sinks.

III. MRP Theory
Economic theory provides insight into why owners spend so much on
player salaries. Player talent is an input into team performance.
Managers and owners can choose to field a lower quality team or a higher
quality team [Fort, 2003, 106]. Fort measures quality with team winning
percentage. This is an accurate measurement because conference
standings in professional sports are determined by a team’s wins and
losses. The NHL is slightly different from other professional sports
organizations because it uses points to establish conference standings and
play-off spots. Teams receive two points for a win, one point for a tie,
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and no points for a loss in the regular season.
A belief generally held by sports fans, owners, and economists is that
higher quality costs more than lower quality. “The more an owner wants
to win, the more it is going to cost” [Fort, 2003, 105]. The marginal
revenue product, or MRP theory, explains the logic behind this viewpoint.
The MRP for labor is defined as: MRP = MP * MR. In the context of the
NHL, MP is the player’s contribution to the team’s winning percentage
and MR is the marginal revenue produced by the player’s contribution to
winning. An MRP in this case represents the player’s contribution to
revenue earned by the team owner [Fort, 2003, 184]. In a competitive
market, salaries should equal a player’s MRP. Owners would compare
the cost of winning and an athlete’s MRP to determine whether the player
is worth hiring. A player’s salary should rise for one of two reasons
under the theory–the team’s revenue increases or a player’s contribution
to revenue increases. Players in all professional sports get paid close to
their MRP [Fort, 2003, 186].
One problem with the MRP approach is that most players enter into
lengthy contracts at the beginning of a season, before revenue or team
performance has been determined. As a result, it is difficult to calculate
a player’s expected MRP. Many factors, including experience, past
performance and injuries, age, and team performance, enter into the
calculation. Owners and general managers are expected to have a clear
understanding of a player’s expected contribution to a team before he
joins the team. They are ridiculed when a player on their team underperforms and praised when an athlete exceeds expectations. Owners and
general managers are assumed by sports economists to have perfect
information about a player’s past performance and injuries. Information
that is unavailable to owners and economists but crucial to performance
is a player’s psychological condition or tendency toward injury. Player
characteristics that are difficult to quantify may inhibit the owner from
making a correct decision.
Athletes make millions of dollars because those with high MRPs are
in limited supply. For example, there is only one Jaromir Jagr. Jagr
earned the crown of top scorer from 1997-2001 and was recently traded
to the New York Rangers from the Washington Capitals. He will make
$11 million per year. There are players everyone wants but everyone
cannot have. As a result of the limited supply, salaries skyrocket.
Teams with higher payrolls are paying for a higher winning
percentage. If this held up on the rink, the Detroit Red Wings should
have lost to the New York Rangers in the Stanley Cup finals last year
because they had the highest payrolls in the league, $68.0 and $69.2
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million, respectively.1 Yet the Rangers did not make the playoffs and the
Red Wings lost four consecutive games in the first round. Conversely, the
New Jersey Devils, with the eighth highest payroll, won the Stanley Cup
over the Anaheim Mighty Ducks, who were 17th. The Minnesota Wild
became semifinalists with the lowest payroll. Apparently, payroll is not
the only factor that determines team quality–Minnesota showed that it is
possible for a small market team to turn a profit while staying
competitive.

IV. Evaluating the Teams
There is a mixture of profitable large and small market teams, but many
are sinking into the red. They are all part of the same league, work under
the same collective bargaining agreement, and share the same rules on the
ice. The differences lie in management and player skills, fan preference,
government backing, and a host of other factors. The analysis will
highlight teams that have effectively used their limited resources and
some that have not.
Recently, franchises with high payrolls have not been more
competitive or shown higher operating revenue at the end of the season.
Small market teams have a difficult time in professional sports, especially
in the NHL, where only 12 percent of the league’s revenue is shared
among its 30 teams. In comparison, the National Football League (NFL)
splits 62 percent of revenue [Egan, 2003, 94]. Last season the St. Louis
Blues lost $29 million, the Mighty Ducks of Anaheim dropped $11
million, and the Carolina Hurricanes posted a $13 million loss [Egan,
2003, 94]. In its fourth year of existence, the Minnesota Wild surprised
many people by recording the largest profit in the league, $20 million.
Doug J. Risebrough, Minnesota’s general manager, controlled costs by
not overspending on players.
Risebrough did his own MRP calculation. He figured a star player in
the National Basketball Association (NBA) might play 40 of 48 minutes
in a game, handle the ball on most of his team’s possessions, and take 25
shots per game. The Wild’s best player, 21-year-old right wing Marian
Gaborik, probably plays 18 of 60 minutes, has the puck a minute of that
time, and takes approximately three shots a game. [Farber, 2003, 100].
Risebrough refused to pay his players like athletes in other sports because
the marginal revenue would not exceed the marginal cost. The Wild has
sold out every game since its inception. That is important in the NHL
where 50 percent of revenue, including play-off games, comes from gate
receipts [Brehm, 2003, 6]. Playoff games are also a significant source of
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revenue. A team is almost guaranteed to make a profit if it can make the
playoffs with a low payroll [Badenhausen, 2003a, 4]. “People are looking
at [Minnesota] as a model franchise–not overspending, playing well,
selling out tickets, and selling out their suites,” said Gordon Saint-Denis,
President of Triton Sports Association, a professional sports valuation
company [Egan, 2003, 94]. That was last year. This season Minnesota
finished the season in 10th place in the Western Conference, eights points
from a play-off bid. Minnesota was competitive in the short run; it is
questionable whether the team can maintain its profits in the long run
given its low-cost strategy.
The New York Rangers are a team that has been consistent in the long
run. They have consistently paid near top salaries in the NHL but have
not made the playoffs for seven consecutive seasons. This is in a league
where 16 of the 30 teams qualify to compete for the Stanley Cup. In the
NFL there is room for 12 of the 32 teams in the play-offs and in Major
League Baseball (MLB) only eight of the 30 have a shot in the
postseason. The Rangers’ performance level is extremely low.
Forbes, a financial magazine, developed the Team Relative
Productivity Score (TRPS) to compare pay versus performance for NHL
teams. The statistic looks at the number of wins per player payroll
relative to the rest of the NHL. Playoff wins are counted twice as heavily
and ties are counted half as much. The Rangers score of 42 means the
team achieved 58 percent fewer victories per dollar of payroll than the
league average. Table 1 shows the best and worst NHL teams in terms of
TRPS, according to Forbes [Badenhausen, 2003a, 4].
Table 1
Best
Team

Worst
TRPS

Team

TRPS

Ottawa Senators

201

New York Rangers

42

Minnesota Wild

199

Carolina Hurricanes

66

Tampa Bay Lightening

154

Detroit Red Wings

68

Vancouver Canucks

154

Montreal Canadiens

68

Anaheim Mighty Ducks

149

San Jose Sharks

71
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Saint-Denis, founder of the sports valuation firm Triton Sports
Association, said the ratio of player costs and performance “is something
that is very important when we value franchises. It’s an indication of
management’s strength” [Badenhausen, 2003a, 4]. What a high TRPS
rating does not indicate is positive operating income. Anaheim lost $10.8
million in operating revenue and Ottawa was in the red $2 million.
Vancouver stayed afloat, posting $700,000 in operating revenue. All of
the teams in the lower TRPS bracket lost money during the 2002-03
season. Furthermore, the TRPS rating does not illustrate total points.
Detroit led its division with 110 points and led the league in scoring
[Diamond, 2003, 219]. In the first round of the playoffs, Anaheim upset
Detroit in a four-game series. Sports statistics cannot explain everything.
The Edmonton Oilers have two strikes against them in the NHL; they
are a small-market team in Canada. Canadian teams frequently complain
about lack of government support and about their weak dollar in relation
to the United States’ dollar. Despite Canada’s love for the game, the
Quebec Nordiques became the Colorado Avalanche in 1995, the Hartford
Whalers relocated to North Carolina and the Winnepeg Jets moved to
Phoenix in 1997. Nevertheless, the Oilers have been able to attain a
consistent degree of success. Edmonton has made the play-offs in six of
the last eight seasons. The Oiler’s management strategy is recycling and
bargain hunting for younger athletes. Recycling involves trading skilldeveloped, expensive players for cheaper players with a high potential.
Player turnover is high, but Kevin Lowe, the team’s general manager, said
fans recognize that Oiler management does its best and the stadium is
nearly full at every game [Greenburg, 2003, 22]. The Oilers prove fan
loyalty and point totals do not have to come at the expense of the bottom
line. Edmonton only lost $100,000 in operating income for the 2002-03
season, much less than more than half of all NHL teams [Badenhausen,
2003b]. Former Edmonton General Manager Glen Sather, now with the
Rangers, surprisingly agrees with Lowe. “At some point the field is going
to level out. We’re learning guys making big dough are not better than
guys making $2 million. I wish I had young players like Edmonton does”
[Greenburg, 2003, 22].
The Detroit Red Wings have the best of all worlds, or so it seems.
Detroit is a large market team with a sound fan base and a history of
winning. They have played in the post season every year since 1990,
winning three Stanley Cups in the last seven seasons. Detroit also has the
highest payroll in the NHL this season. Detroit is “Hockeytown” and has
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been for more than three-quarters of a century. In the 2001-02 season the
Red Wings used veterans and the best players on paper to win the Stanley
Cup, after finishing the regular season with 116 points, 15 more than the
next best club [Diamond, 2003, 267]. Detroit got what it paid $64.4
million for–a championship team. The Red Wings are to hockey what the
New York Yankees are to baseball, except that the Yankees bank a
positive operating income. Detroit lost $13.7 million in the 2002-03
season [Badenhausen, 2003b].
It may be that Detroit is prone to diminishing returns to a variable
input. Given a level of fixed inputs, increasing the use of variable inputs
eventually results in decreased marginal product [Fort, 2003. 96]. The
most significant variable input, in terms of cost, is players on an NHL
team. In the short run–a season–the stadium expenses are fixed and
owners can trade up or down to increase or decrease their player costs.
It is not possible for Detroit to sell an extra ticket to an already soldout
stadium or vie for more TV revenue once a contract is signed. Unless
adding a higher-priced player to the roster gets Detroit one game further
in the playoffs, the Red Wings’ profit decreases. If Detroit already has
enough talented players to win the Stanley Cup, adding another top-dollar
athlete has no benefit. This is a dilemma all General Managers face.
The NHL is evolving. More teams are putting top draft picks on the
roster, instead of sending them to junior leagues. Three of the top five
goal scorers at midseason this year have played fewer than 200 NHL
games and the average age of the top 10 NHL scorers has dipped from
30.8 in 2001-02 to 28.6 in the last two years [Farber, 2004, 42]. “This
NHL generational shift has been tectonic. Fresh faces have made the
learning curve flatter than Saskatchewan” [Farber, 2004, 42]. This should
be delightful news to owners; the opportunity for free agency increases
with experience in the NHL. There are six levels of free agency in the
NHL. As a player’s age and experience increase, the restrictions on his
mobility weaken. More teams can bid on a player with some level of free
agency, so it is almost certain that such athletes will have higher salaries.
Players with restricted mobility, mainly younger players, do not have this
bargaining power. One way small market, low payroll teams can catch a
bargain is if they draft well.
There are many ways to manage an NHL franchise, although few
were profitable last season. Edmonton and Minnesota have shown that
small-market teams can make a profit with a winning team by controlling
player costs. No one disputes the fact that the Rangers have serious
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problems, while Detroit, also a large market team, dominates on the ice
but not in operating revenue. Evaluating individual franchises provides
insight into management performance, but economic research may shed
light on the broader picture.

V. Granger Causality 2
The coefficient of correlation between total points and team payroll was
calculated for all years for which data was available. There is a moderate
positive relationship between the two variables, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Year

Coefficient of Correlation

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

0.278
0.545
0.528
0.581
0.416
0.303

Although the coefficient of correlation is a good measure of the
relationship between team payroll and team performance, it cannot be
used to determine causality. The belief in professional sports is that team
payroll is a predictor of team performance. This assumption needs to be
statistically tested for the NHL. Identifying causality with econometric
tools has always been a problem, but a Granger causality test can be used
to determine precedence.
Hall, Syzymanski, and Zimbalist, three leading sports economists,
performed a Granger causality test with Major League Baseball (MLB)
relative payroll and performance data. Granger causality does not test for
theoretical causality. Granger causality is a circumstance when one timeseries variable consistently and predictably changes before another
variable does [Studenmund, 2001, 423]. If one variable precedes another
it does not guarantee that the first variable causes the second but more
than likely the opposite is not true. The study concluded that team
performance Granger causes relative team payroll in MLB. They also
used complementary data from English soccer, which produced
conflicting results. They concluded that differences in the way soccer and
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baseball markets operate are due to the variations in the institutional rules
that govern them. MLB imposes restrictions on trade, player mobility,
roster sizes, and player spending, much like in the NHL. English soccer,
on the other hand, is more of a free labor market.
I performed a Granger Causality test using NHL data from 1998 to
2003. Hall, Syzamanski, and Zimbalist calculated that their variables
from MLB and English soccer were stationary, so I assumed that team
performance and team payroll in the NHL were stationary as well. A
stationary time series is one whose basic properties do not change over
time [Studenmund, 2001, 424]. The market for NHL labor closely
parallels that of MLB labor. Results of the test were consistent with those
of the MLB Granger causality test mentioned above. I am unable to reject
the hypothesis that team performance Granger causes team payroll;
however, I can reject the hypothesis that team payroll Granger causes
team performance.
My regression equation is:

yi is the dependent variable and xi is the independent variable. “A
variable z can be said to Granger cause a variable w if the coefficient b 2
for the regression with w on the left hand side (LHS) is economically and
statistically significant, whereas the coefficient b 2 for the regression with
z on the LHS is economically and statistically insignificant” [Hall, 2002,
161].
The test using NHL data was completed in two steps. In the first step
team points were regressed against lagged team points and lagged relative
team payroll, giving estimates of b 2 . Relative team payroll was then
regressed against lagged relative team payroll and lagged team points,
giving estimates of b 2 in step two. The results of this estimation are given
in Table 3.
Table 3
Estimates of B 2: 1998-2003 for National Hockey League
Dependent Variable
Team points
Relative team payroll

Coefficient for $2

t-statistic

p-value

-2.19

-0.395

0.6934

0.00545

3.72

0.0003
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b 2 is not significant when team points is the dependent variable. The pvalue is clearly too large for lagged relative team payroll to be statistically
significant as xi, t-1 . In step two b2 is statistically significant at greater than
the 1% level with a p-value of .0003. This occurs when relative team
payroll is the dependent variable and team points is xi, t-1 . One implication
is that team points Granger causes relative team payroll. Of greater
importance is that relative team payroll does not Granger cause team
points. In other words, there is no evidence that relative team payroll
precedes team points. This is consistent with the results from MLB.

VI. Further Econometric Work
A question arises from the results of the Granger causality test: Why are
NHL salaries increasing at a substantial rate if payroll does not influence
team performance? Salary is determined by player skills and team
revenue. Kahane uses a hierarchical linear model to address this. He
proposes that the salary of a player is not only determined by his
attributes but by team-level qualities. Kahane concludes that players on
a team with higher revenues are compensated more than players on a
lower revenue team, all things being equal [Kahane, 2001, 631]. Thus,
teams with higher payrolls may or may not have better players, but just
have more money to spend on their players. This is one way team
performance could Granger cause payroll. If an NHL team is successful
in the short-run and makes it to the play-offs revenues will increase.
According to Kahane, as revenues increase so will a team’s payroll
expenditures. It appears that NHL owners and general managers
overestimate revenues.
Richardson proposes a different reason for escalating NHL salaries.
Richardson uses 1993-94 data from the NHL to test the relationship
between marginal revenue products and salaries while estimating a
revenue equation. The research supports the hypothesis that higher paid
players have higher MRPs and that winning regular season games and
making the playoffs significantly increases team revenues [Richardson,
2000, 402]. He also measures competitive balance in the NHL using
winning percentages and play-off games. The correlation coefficient for
winning percentage and one or two year lags is high. In the long run, on
the other hand, the trend is toward more competitive balance. The lag
coefficients for play-off games are much weaker than those for winning
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percentages; playoff games show no evidence of imbalance. Richardson
argues that the financial payoff to a winning team and the competitive
balance in the league encourages the bidding up of players’ salaries
[Richardson, 2000, 412]. The limitation of this study is that it was
performed with data from 10 years ago. Current data should be analyzed
to determine if changes in the league, specifically the escalation of
salaries, have influenced competitive balance or the calculation of
players’ MRP.

VII. Other factors that influence team performance
Payroll has not been shown to be the sole determinant of team
performance. Wage disparity, psychological conditions, general
managers, and luck play a role in the success of a team. Additional
research has shown the degree of salary inequality within a team
influences team production. There has been a marked increase in NHL
average salaries in the last decade. In the 1980s the average salary grew
by 33 percent while in the 1990s there was a 299 percent escalation [Fort,
2003, 181]. The dispersion of salaries has grown between and within
teams. Wage dispersion occurs when not every player receives the same
salary. Greater wage dispersion occurs when there is a large gap between
the highest paid player on a team and the lowest paid player. Wage
inequality within teams can be viewed as a deterrent to team performance.
Evidence from NHL data supports the hypothesis that wage
compression should be a goal of managers. Gini coefficients were
calculated for all 26 teams in the NHL and included in a regression with
average player salaries for 1996-97. Lorenz curves measure salary
distribution by plotting the cumulative percentage of players against the
cumulative percentage of total salary income for a particular team.
[Quirk, 1992, 235]. A straight Lorenz curve indicates no salary
dispersion while one that bulges from the 45 degree line shows an
unequal distribution of income. The Gini coefficient is found by
calculating the area of the bulge relative to the total area below the line
of income equality [Quirk, 1992, 237]. The Gini coefficient increases as
a team’s wage dispersion increases. Season-ending point totals by team
were regressed on the team’s Gini coefficient and average team salary.
The regression results were as follows (t-values in parenthesis):
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POINTS = 69.99 – 65.51GINI + .05SALARY
R² = .3

(4.73)

(-1.37)

(3.38)

[Sommers, 1998, 119]

Salary is shown to have a positive statistically significant effect on
POINTS at greater than the one percent level. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that player salaries parallel the quality of player performance
and that teams with higher payrolls should tally more points at the end of
the season than teams with lower payrolls. The negative sign on the Gini
coefficient leads one to believe that as the Gini coefficient increases,
points decrease. “One can conclude that unequal salary distributions may
create morale problems severe enough to affect worker productivity”
[Sommers, 1998, 19]. According to Sommers’ research, teams with high
payrolls and relatively equal wage distribution should have more points
at the end of the season than teams with high payrolls and unequal wage
distribution. One should take care when evaluating these results. The
sample of 26 teams is relatively small and the regression model has a
small adjusted R-squared. Even so, this may be a key to successful small
market teams. Teams with lower payrolls should concentrate on
maintaining an equal distribution of salaries because team cohesiveness
could somewhat offset the negative impact of having less money to spend.
A crucial element to any team’s success is how its members interact.
Rarely does a team reach its potential productivity. In 1972 Ivan Steiner
developed a model to show the relation between individual abilities on a
team and how team members interact [Weinberg, 2003, 167]. His model
is shown by the following equation:
Actual productivity= potential productivity – losses due to faulty group processes

Steiner defined potential productivity as a team’s best possible
performance, given each player’s ability, knowledge, and skill, as well as
the demands of the task. Steiner did conclude that individual ability is
more than likely the principal resource for athletic teams so the team
made up of the best individuals will usually achieve the most success.
Motivation losses and coordination losses, those that occur when the
timing between teammates is off, are the two main kinds of faulty group
processes. Teams that rely on greater interaction are more susceptible to
coordination losses. [Weinberg, 2003, 167] In professional hockey, a
puck travels at approximately 70-80 mph and seldom does one player
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have control of it longer than a few seconds. Team interaction is a vital
part of the game.
The size and speed of the puck makes luck an integral part of each
and every game as well. Inches can make or break a game-winning goal.
According to Sport Psychology Professor Mickey Mack from the
University of Northern Iowan, luck is one of the key factors in any
sporting event. Team A may be a better team than Team B statistically
and have a greater probability of winning. Unfortunately for Team A,
probability is insignificant when the score is 2-2 in overtime during the
seventh game of the Stanley Cup finals.

VIII. Conclusion
A high payroll is not a necessity in the NHL. The teams with the highest
payrolls did not go far in the playoffs, nor did they do well financially last
season. Team performance is seen to Granger cause relative team payroll
while the opposite can be rejected. Even still, competitive balance and
increasing revenues have caused massive salary inflation in the league.
Sommers found that high average salaries move with team performance
but wage inequality negatively influences team performance in the NHL.
Team productivity is largely affected by the interactions of team
members, giving general managers an economical way to increase
success. Recent developments have changed the outlook of many teams
in the NHL, financially and on the ice. A larger supply of adequate young
players, stabilizing or decreasing TV revenue, and severe operating
revenue problems are changing the NHL. The evidence seems to suggest
that owners need to assess their players’ MRP more carefully before
signing a contract worth millions of dollars.
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Endnotes
1.
2.

All NHL team payrolls were taken from http://hockeyzoneplus.com/$maseq_e.htm
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